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Abstract
We revisit the simultaneous equations model of rebellion, mobilization, grievances and repression
proposed by Gurr and Moore (1997). Our main contribution is to clarify and improve on the
underlying identification strategy by resorting to the well-known colonization instruments recently
constructed by Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001, 2002). We also emphasize the role played
by the institutional environment. Instrumental variables estimates for post-colonial societies reveal
that the strength of the state, as proxied empirically by an index of bureaucratic quality, exerts
a strong preventive eﬀect on rebellion. On the other hand, working institutions also influence the
likelihood of rebellion indirectly, through mobilization. Our estimates suggest that this indirect eﬀect
increases rebellion. As such, the total net eﬀect of better institutions on rebellion is ambiguous.
1 Introduction
Over the past several decades, civil conflicts have constituted one of the major concerns of scholars in
the field of political violence. Recent tragedies, such as the bloody wars in ex-Yugoslavia and Rwanda,
have contributed to a high degree of attention being paid both by academics and the public to the issue
of ethnopolitical rebellion. Among political scientists, the debate has largely been articulated around
the grievances-mobilization nexus.
A first approach, personified by Gurr (1968, 1970, 1993a, 1994), places grievances in the driver’s seat.
The principal cause of political violence is assumed to be the discrepancy between a group’s aspirations
and its achievements, often referred to as relative deprivation. The crux of Gurr’s work has been eth-
nopolitical rebellion, in large part thanks to his creation of the Minorities At Risk (henceforth, MAR)
database, which documents the situations faced by minority groups worldwide. Pervasive poverty, vari-
ous forms of discrimination, or unemployment aﬀecting a population creates the necessary and suﬃcient
conditions for upheaval through an underlying mechanism which is essentially psychological. This vision
was challenged by the proponents of the "mobilization approach", personified by Tilly (1975, 1978).
According to this alternative view, the necessary condition for violence is the capacity for a group to
organize its interests. The presence of grievances among groups is too frequent in practice for it to be able
to predict the outbreak of episodes of violence. A typical example is given by Jenkins and Perrow (1977)
who explain that farm workers revolted in the late 1960s and not in the 1940s because of diﬀerences
between the two decades in terms of their capacity for mobilization, whereas the level of their grievances
was comparable throughout the period. Besides contrasting these two approaches, a number of scholars
have tried to synthesize them, in particular by assuming that grievances aﬀect mobilization, while both
grievances and mobilization aﬀect rebellion (see, for example, Gurr (1993b)).
A number of studies have tried to disentangle the puzzle econometrically. Broadly speaking, one can
distinguish two approaches. A first strand of the empirical literature confines its attention to single-
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equation techniques. Examples include Collier and Hoeﬄer (2004), Reynal-Querol (2002) and Fearon and
Laitin (1999, 2003) whose dependent variable is the outbreak of civil war. In these studies, identification
is "achieved" by lagging the explanatory variables suspected of endogeneity, without resorting either to
an explicit structural model or to a clearly motivated identification strategy. A second strand of the
literature, typified by Gurr (1993b), Lindström and Moore (1995), or Gurr and Moore (1997) adopts a
simultaneous equation approach in which the interractions between key variables are explicitly specified
as are the exclusion restrictions that result in identification. The main goal of the present paper is to
attempt to clarify the identification strategy that must be adopted be it in a limited (single equation)
or full-information (simultaneous equation) context. Roughly speaking, our proposed identification
strategy is based on introducing institutional factors explicitly into the analysis.
The first point that we make in this paper is that accounting explicitly for the institutional envi-
ronment is both conceptually important and empirically necessary if one is to consistently estimate the
parameters of interest in a model such as Gurr and Moore’s. North (1990) defines institutions to be "the
rules of the game in a society, or, more formally, [as] the humanly devised constraints that shape human
interactions". Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001, 2002), Engerman and Sokoloﬀ (1997, 2005) and
Banerjee and Iyer (2005), among others, show that institutional arrangements are one of the main deter-
minants of the observed pattern of economic development worldwide. Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson
(2001, henceforth, AJR), in a widely-cited article, show that the form taken by colonization in the nine-
teenth century has had a persistent and quantitatively important impact on the GDP per capita of the
colonized countries right up to the 1990s. They distinguish "extractive" institutions from "settlement"
institutions. In the former case, the colonial power faced a high rate of settler mortality and often dis-
posed of valuable natural resources in the colony. It therefore built a barebones administration whose
sole goal was to secure the fruits of colonization and repatriate profits to the home country. In the latter
case, in which the aforementioned conditions were reversed, colonization took the shape of stable and
substantial settlement by white colonists, who proceeded to create institutions mimicking those of the
colonial power.
The upshot is that when institutions are extractive, economic development does not obtain, whereas
institutions of the "settlement" type have yielded the so-called neo-Europes (the USA, Canada, New
Zealand and Australia). Given that the institutional environment is such an important determinant of
economic development, it seems reasonable to posit that it is an important determinant of conflict as well,
in that many of the same incentives are at work. More specifically, our hypothesis is that when extractive
institutions are in place, it is likely that the state confines its control to areas of economic value (such
as mining, see Herbst (2000)) and is unlikely to furnish growth-promoting public goods since its role is
largely confined to rent-seeking (McGuire and Olson (1996)). According to Fearon and Laitin (2003),
lack of control by the state over its jurisdiction as a whole is conducive to conflict, while dependence on
natural resources has been found to be an important determinant of conflict both by Collier and Hoeﬄer
(2004) and Collier, Elliott, Hegre, Hoeﬄer, Reynal-Querol, and Sambanis (2003).
The second point, which is related to the first, is that omitting institutional variables, as is done in
many empirical papers on the determinants of rebellion, may lead one to identify a spurious correlation
between two variables that is largely driven by a third, omitted, variable that influences both. A case
in point is provided by the link between GDP per capita and the outbreak of civil war. In general,
and in an eﬀort to avoid problems of reverse causality, GDP per capita is often lagged by one period
in a rebellion equation. But if GDP per capita and the outbreak of civil war are both explained by
institutions, and institutions (which are likely to be highly persistent) are left out of the specification,
then any purported link between GDP per capita and the outbreak of civil war may not, in fact, exist.
In this paper, we attempt to deal with just this sort of problem through our use of the AJR instrument
set in the framework of a simultaneous equations model.
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In what follows, we base ourselves on the model of Gurr and Moore (1997), which consists of four
endogenous variables (and thus four structural equations): rebellion, mobilization, repression and griev-
ances. Gurr and Moore (henceforth, GM) estimate the system by three-stage least squares (3SLS) and
show that mobilization aﬀects rebellion, contrary to grievances, which do not. Grievances, on the other
hand, are a strong predictor of mobilization. To begin with, we reconsider their identification strategy,
which is based in part upon the assumption that political and economic discrimination are exogenous.
We argue that this maintained hypothesis is potentially dubious. We then propose to endogenize the
discrimination variables by instrumenting them using the AJR instrument set. Though the results we
obtain are unconvincing in terms of the underlying identification strategy (more specifically, the AJR
instruments do not appear to be suﬃciently "strong" predictors of the discrimination variables), they
do highlight the key role played by institutions. In particular, bureaucratic quality appears to exert a
significant negative eﬀect on rebellion, leading us to delve more deeply into the relationships linking in-
stitutions, mobilization and grievances. Setting aside the instrumentation of the discrimination variables
(and thus appealing to the same exogeneity assumption as GM), we focus on the structural role played
by institutions, and include them in the mobilization and grievances equations. Our main finding within
the 3SLS context is that bureaucratic quality exerts a significant positive eﬀect on mobilization. Its net
eﬀect on rebellion is then ambiguous.
As a test of the robustness of our findings, we relax our functional assumptions and consider two-stage
least squares (2SLS) estimation of each individual equation. Though this results in a loss of eﬃciency,
in that we do not exploit the information stemming from the correlations among the disturbance terms
of all four equations, there is reason to be cautious concerning results based on 3SLS. This is because, in
contrast to single-equation methods, 3SLS can result in the "contamination", through the joint variance-
covariance matrix, of all of the results even if only one of the equations in the system is mis-specified. The
outcome of this exercise is that our earlier results regarding institutions based on the 3SLS specification
are confirmed, and that the omission by GM of the institutional variables in several of their equations is
an unwarranted restriction.
As a final robustness check, we consider whether functioning institutions increase legally-based mo-
bilization at the expense of its military counterpart. Having found no evidence of such a phenomenon,
we conclude that good institutions do indeed have an ambiguous eﬀect on rebellion.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we briefly summarize the theoretical approaches
based on grievances on the one hand, and mobilization on the other, as well as the attempts to synthesize
the two. In section 3 we discuss the identification strategy adopted by GM as well as our initial approach
based on endogenizing the discrimination variables. In section 4 we present our 3SLS estimation results
and compare them with the GM specification. Section 5 is devoted to ascertaining whether the relation-
ships that we identified, linking institutions, mobilization and grievances; using 3SLS, hold up to more
robust single equation methods. We also delve more deeply into the relationship between institutions
and mobilization. Section 6 concludes.
2 Grievances versus mobilization
The influential work of Gurr (1968, 1970, 1973) led to a widely-held belief that relative deprivation,
also referred to as grievances, was the principal cause of political violence. Based on the frustration-
aggression model of Davies (1962), Gurr (1968) defined relative deprivation as the perception by members
of a group of a cleavage between their aspirations (in terms of what they perceive to be their rightful
lot, materially and politically) and their capacities (that which they can actually achieve). For Gurr, as
well as for Galtung (1964) or Feierabend and Feierabend (1966, 1972), such cleavages are the sources of
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violent collective action.
This approach was put in doubt by Snyder and Tilly (1972), Oberschall (1973), Tilly (1975, 1978),
Gamson (1975), Jenkins and Perrow (1977), McCarthy and Zald (1977) and Collier and Hoeﬄer (2004),
who highlighted the key role played by mobilization as a source of conflict. Violent collective action is
no longer seen as an "irrational" consequence of frustration, but rather as the result of cool economic
calculus. The creation and survival of a critical mass of violent armed individual depends on their ability
to generate private benefits through their actions, as has been stressed recently by Collier and Hoeﬄer,
leading to a further weakening of the grievances hypothesis.
The Tilly versus Gurr dichotomy has led to a number of attempts at compromise, either by including
mobilization in a theory of relative deprivation (Korpi (1974), Moore and Jaggers (1990), Gurr (1993a,
1993b, 1997)), or by recognizing that grievances can facilitate mobilization. Gurr (1993b), for example,
assumes that relative deprivation simultaneously aﬀects rebellion (protest) and mobilization; relative
deprivation and mobilization, in turn, then both aﬀect the intensity of rebellion. On the other hand,
his empirical results do not allow one to reject the null hypothesis that grievances have a direct impact
on rebellion.
Lindström and Moore (1995) have called Gurr’s (1993b) empirical strategy into doubt and suggest
a simultaneous equations approach, which is also implemented with minor changes in Gurr and Moore
(1997). Their principal empirical finding is that grievances do not have a direct eﬀect on rebellion,
in contrast to mobilization, which thereby becomes the key determinant of violent collective action.
Moreover, the relative deprivation variables (economic and political discrimination) increase mobilization,
thereby indirectly influencing (and increasing) violence.
3 Identification strategy
3.1 The Gurr and Moore approach
The empirical basis for both Lindström and Moore (1995) and GM is the estimation by 3SLS of a system
of four equations: rebellion (protest), grievances, mobilization and repression (or group coherence). All
variables stem from the MAR dataset.
In order to render our results comparable with those of GM, we begin by adopting their empirical
framework, though we shall consider the instrumentation issue in greater detail. Ignoring intercepts,
their basic econometric specification is then given by:
Rebellion = β11Grievances+ β12Mobilization (1)
+β13DemocraticPower + β14InternationalRebellion
Mobilization = β21GroupCoherence+ β22Repression+ β23Grievances (2)
Grievances = β31PoliticalDiscrimination+ β32EconomicDiscrimination (3)
+β33DemographicDistress+ β34LostAutonomy + β35PastRepression
Repression = β41Democracy + β42PastRepressionSuccess (4)
Our first econometric critique of the GM approach focuses on the grievances equation which poten-
tially suﬀers, in our opinion, from significant endogeneity bias, given that it is diﬃcult to argue that the
two discrimination variables are exogenous. Intuitively, observed levels of discrimination stem from a
rational decision by the state which is the outcome of a trade-oﬀ between institutional constraints on
discriminatory behavior and the ability of the minority to resist. As such, excluding rebellion from the
determinants of discrimination is untenable, leading to a failure of their identification strategy.
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The ability to discriminate is an increasing function of eﬀective political power. Following Acemoglu,
Johnson, and Robinson (2005) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2005, 2006), political power can be divided
into de jure power (defined by constitutional constraints) and de facto power (which includes the ability
of a minority to subject the state to costs). As an illustration of the trade-oﬀ between these two forms of
power, Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) argue that it was only under the threat of worker revolt that the
United Kingdom progressively extended the franchise during the course of the 19th century. Aumann
and Kurz (1977) argue that a defeated minority can destroy its assets, while Acemoglu (2005) suggests
that minorities may choose to evade their taxes. In the same paper, Acemoglu (2005) associates de facto
power with the ability of the minority to engage in successful and violent rebellion, as in Grossman and
Noh (1990). In the absence of minority de facto power, the state sets its taxation rate at the maximum
level that is compatible with the Laﬀer curve (McGuire and Olson (1996)), and this remains potentially
true in terms of other forms of discrimination. The upshot is that one would expect, in countries
with working institutions and where the state is strong, to see, ceteris paribus, a greater capacity to
discriminate.
3.2 The AJR instruments
Our identification strategy is based on the instruments initially introduced by Acemoglu, Johnson, and
Robinson (2001). In particular, we assume that settler mortality at the time of colonization, as well as
democracy, constraints on the executive, the proportion of white settlers in 1900, and population density
in 1500, aﬀect current levels of rebellion only indirectly through their impact on discrimination.
In order to be admissible, an instrumental variable must satisfy two conditions. First, it must be
correlated with the endogeneous variable, once other exogenous covariates have been "partialled out"
of the specification. This is known as the issue of instrument "strength" or "weakness", and has
been the object of a great deal of recent econometric research.1 Second, a valid instrument must
be orthogonal with respect to the disturbance term of the structural equation, meaning that it must
have no direct eﬀect on the dependent variable. This is known as an "exclusion restriction" in that it
must be theoretically and empirically palatable for the instrument in question to be excluded from the
structural equation that one is interested in estimating. Combining both conditions implies that a valid
instrumental variable must only aﬀect the dependent variable indirectly through the jointly endogenous
right-hand-side variable. In section 1, we mustered various heuristic arguments that would lead one to
expect a link between the AJR instruments and various measures of discrimination. The validity of the
exclusion restrictions, on the other hand, is predicated on controlling for observable covariates that may
be correlated with the AJR instruments and which appear in the rebellion equation. Such covariates
include ethnolinguistic fragmentation, GDP per capita, and institutions, the latter being proxied by
variables that quantify law and order and bureaucratic quality. In order to increase the likelihood that
the exclusion restrictions on the AJR instruments are valid, we systematically control for these variables
each time the AJR instruments come into play.
4 Results based on 3SLS
4.1 Discrimination variables assumed exogenous
Results are presented in Table 1. In column (1), we reproduce the GM results, while in column (2)
we keep their specification while restricting ourselves to the subsample constituted by ex-colonies. The
subsample of ex-colonies is almost exclusively constituted by developing countries except for three of
1See also the excellent surveyby Hahn and Hausman (2003), and a recent very short primer on the ensuing biases by
Hahn and Hausman (2002).
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the four so-called neo-Europes: Australia, the United States and Canada. As Australia and Canada
disappear when additional variables are included, we decided to exclude the United States from the
estimations in order to preserve a homogeneous sample of developing countries.2
As should be obvious, very little changes with respect to the GM results when estimating over this
subsample. In particular, in the rebellion equation, grievances remain statistically indistinguishable
from zero, mobilization continues to exercise a positive and statistically significant impact (with the
point estimate being even larger than that in the original GM results), and the coeﬃcient associated
with democratic power is negative and statistically significant at usual levels of confidence. The only
minor diﬀerence is that the coeﬃcient associated with international rebellion is estimated less precisely,
although the point estimate is very similar.
In the mobilization equation, all variables continue to be statistically significant as in GM, while
the magnitudes of the point estimates are somewhat smaller. In the grievances equation, the point
estimates associated with demographic distress, lost autonomy, and past repression, as well as the as-
sociated standard errors, are similar to those reported by GM, while the statistical significance of the
discrimination variables is enhanced: in GM, economic discrimination has a positive and statistically
significant impact on grievances, while the eﬀect of political discrimination is negative and statistically
indistinguishable from zero. For the ex-colonies subsample, in contrast, political discrimination exerts a
negative, and statistically significant, eﬀect on grievances while the eﬀect of economic discrimination is
still significant. Finally, in the repression equation, democracy continues to be statistically insignificant,
while past repression success increases repression in a statistically significant manner for both samples.
4.2 Discrimination variables assumed jointly endogenous
In column (3) of Table 1, political and economic discrimination are allowed to be endogenous, and we
achieve identification using the AJR instrument set. The coeﬃcient associated with grievances in the
rebellion equation becomes positive and statistically significant. Conversely, the eﬀect of international
rebellion vanishes, while the coeﬃcient associated with mobilization is divided by more than three, though
it remains statistically significant at the usual levels of confidence. The eﬀect of democratic power is still
indistinguishable from zero, as in GM.
Allowing the discrimination variables to be jointly endogenous increases their associated coeﬃcients
markedly. For political discrimination, the coeﬃcient increases ten-fold, going from −0.36 to −3.69.
For economic discrimination, the increase is less impressive, though still substantial, with the coeﬃcient
increasing from 0.52 to 2.40. As is to be expected once a variable is allowed to be jointly endogenous,
the associated standard errors also increase, but to a lesser extent than the coeﬃcients themselves.
In terms of the other equations that make up the system, very little changes except that the coef-
ficients associated with group coherence and repression in the mobilization equation increase, with the
former becoming statistically significant. The quantitative impact of lost autonomy increases in the third
equation, while the coeﬃcient associated with past repression success (in the repression equation) falls
and is no longer statistically significant.
In summary, instrumenting the discrimination variables leads to grievances becoming significantly
positive in the rebellion equation as well as strengthening the impact of the discrimination variables on
grievances. On the other hand, the specification presented in column (3) is questionable in that variables
that are potentially aﬀected by the instruments are not included. If those variables influence rebellion,
then the exclusion restrictions that underly our results will no longer be valid. As such, columns (4)
to (7) sequentially increase the richness of the specification of the rebellion equation, by adding the
2The results are very similar if these countries are kept in the sample, except for specifications that include our institu-
tional variables. We will discuss this point in greater detail in the next sections.
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logarithm of GDP per capita (column (4)), ethnolinguistic fragmentation (column (5)), law and order
(column (6)), and bureaucratic quality (column (7)). These last two variables should in large part
control for the state of institutions today. Given that it is highly unlikely that GDP per capita and the
current state of institutions are exogenous in this setting (the level of rebellion should aﬀect both wealth
and institutions), both GDP per capita and the institutional variables are also allowed to be jointly
endogenous. We have enough degrees of freedom to do this because of the wealth of the AJR instrument
set.
When GDP per capita is added in column (4), the coeﬃcient associated with this variable displays the
expected (negative) sign but the point estimate is very imprecise. The remaining results are unchanged
with respect to the baseline specification. When we add ethnolinguistic fragmentation in 1960 in column
(5) (the form taken by colonization may have aﬀected the ethnic diversity of the population), its eﬀect
is indistinguishable from zero and the other coeﬃcients and standard errors are unaﬀected.
Finally, the two last columns add the institutional variables. In column (6), law and order appears
to have no eﬀect on rebellion while all other coeﬃcients remain unchanged. The exception is constituted
by the coeﬃcients associated with political and economic discrimination, which are significantly lower,
though still statistically significant at the usual levels of confidence. This confirms that part of the eﬀect
of the instruments was incorrectly attributed to discriminations in the previous regressions.
When bureaucratic quality replaces law and order in column (7), interesting changes in the results
appear. First, the impact of grievances in the rebellion equation diminishes drastically and is no longer
statistically significant. Conversely, the coeﬃcient associated with mobilization increases to 1.79 and is
estimated more precisely. Second, bureaucratic quality exerts a significantly negative eﬀect on rebellion.
Third, the points estimates associated with political and economic discrimination in the grievances
equation return to the levels they displayed in columns (3) to (6).
Table 2 presents the first-stage regressions that correspond to the 3SLS results reported in Table 1.
As should be apparent, the instruments perform very poorly, explaining no more than 7% of the variance
of the discrimination variables. As such, we are very far from the recommendations of Stock, Wright,
and Yogo (2002), namely, a partial R2 of 20% and a partial F−statistic of 10. In addition, there is
reason to be suspicious of the results presented in columns (3), (4) and (5) of Table 1. Given that these
results do not control for the other channels through which the AJR instruments may also operate, the
coeﬃcients associated with discrimination are likely to be upwardly biased. When we add bureaucratic
quality, which is highly correlated with the AJR instruments, the eﬀect of both forms of discrimination
on rebellion vanishes, revealing that most of the impact attributed to discrimination in columns (3-5)
actually stemmed from the omission of controls for the institutional environment. Given that law and
order would appear to have no eﬀect on rebellion, only the last column of Table 1 can be said to satisfy
the exclusion restrictions that identify our specification.
To a certain extent, our results show that the GM findings are robust: grievances only aﬀect rebellion
indirectly through mobilization, while the latter is highly significant in the rebellion equation. The
contribution of the preceding discussion, however, has been to highlight the importance of taking the
institutional context into account, with our preferred proxy being bureaucratic quality. In the next
subsection, we delve more deeply into this question by investigating whether institutions have an impact
on mobilization and grievances as well.
4.3 Institutions, mobilization and grievances
Table 3 reports 3SLS results in which institutions appear only in the mobilization equation (columns
1-2), in the rebellion and mobilization equations (columns 3-4) and in the rebellion, mobilization and
grievances equations (columns 5-6). The discrimination variables are allowed to be exogenous given that
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we showed above that endogenizing these variables leads to a severe weak instruments problem.3 As
should be obvious from the results presented in columns (1) and (2), our previous insights concerning the
rebellion equation are preserved when institutions enter the mobilization equation instead of the rebellion
equation: grievances have little or no direct eﬀect on rebellion, while they aﬀect mobilization. Somewhat
surprisingly, bureaucratic quality appears to significantly increase mobilization, whereas the eﬀect of law
and order is statistically indistinguishable from zero. In the grievances equation, the coeﬃcient associated
with political discrimination is negative and statistically significant, whereas the coeﬃcient associated
with economic discrimination is statistically indistinguishable from zero, as in GM.
The specifications presented in columns (3-4), where institutions enter both the mobilization and
the rebellion equations, confirm the results of columns (1-2). The only notable diﬀerence is that the
logarithm of GDP per capita is now (surprisingly) positive in the rebellion equation when bureaucratic
quality is the proxy for the current institutional context.
Columns (5-6) report results in which institutions enter the first three equations. While all results
remains stable with respect to columns (3-4), it is apparent in column (6) that the coeﬃcient associated
with bureaucratic quality becomes insignificant in the mobilization equation whereas the corresponding
coeﬃcient in the grievances equation is positive and statistically significant. Once again, law and order
is insignificant in all equations.
In our discussion of our identification strategy of section 3.1, we argued that strong states should
be more able to discriminate against or tax minorities. An eﬃcient and pliable administration is a
prerequisite for such policies to be implemented. If the maximization of the ruling elite’s welfare implies
a high level of taxation of minorities, it is necessary to possess an eﬃcient bureaucracy that can collect
taxes locally and hand them over to central authorities. Thus, predatory policies are predicated on
the central government being able to impose its authority upon peripheral areas of the country. As
such, bureaucratic quality should, indirectly, increase rebellion. In columns (3-4), bureaucratic quality is
positively associated with mobilization, which may at first seem surprising as there is no obvious direct
link between the two. However, the results reported in columns (5-6) reveal that bureaucratic quality
significantly increases grievances, while its eﬀect on mobilization is no longer statistically significant.
An obvious condition for the previous line of reasoning to hold water is that a system of democratic
checks and balances on the central government’s authority is lacking, thereby allowing the state’s bu-
reaucracy to be used in a predatory manner. Given that the sample of countries being considered here
is largely drawn from the developing world, and does certainly not correspond to what would be termed
"democracies" in the western sense of the word, this assumption is likely to be reasonable.
Table 4 presents the first-stage reduced forms that correspond to the previous set of 3SLS results.
The endogenous variables that we focus on are law and order and bureaucratic quality. In contrast to
the discrimination reduced forms presented in Table 2, the quality of the instrument set is much more
satisfactory, with the AJR instruments explaining 31% of the variation of law and order and 13% of
bureaucratic quality. The corresponding partial F−statistics are close to the critical values advocated
by the usual rules of thumb alluded to above.
The upshot of this section is that the complex interplay among rebellion, mobilization and griev-
ances is both enriched and complicated when institutions are taken into account. On the one hand, it
would appear that the institutional environment was a crucial omitted variable in the GM framework.
Institutions, captured here by bureaucratic quality, exert a powerful preventive eﬀect on rebellion, which
one might term the "direct deterrence eﬀect". When minorities face a strong state characterized by an
eﬃcient bureaucracy, there is little room to engage in military adventures. Fearon and Laitin (2003)
attributed this role to GDP per capita, which is negatively associated with the likelihood of civil conflict
3Note, however, that the results presented in this section remain largely unchanged even when we assume that the
discrimination variables are endogenous. The corresponding results are available upon request.
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in almost all cross-country regressions. The results presented here suggest, on the other hand, when
institutions and GDP per capita are both taken into account, that the latter is insignificant whereas the
former approximates the deterrence eﬀect of state power. Moreover, bureaucratic quality also influences
rebellion indirectly, through mobilization and grievances. Such indirect eﬀects lead to an increase in the
likelihood of conflict, probably because strong states are more prone to adopt predatory policies against
minorities and since such states are less vulnerable to rebellions. Another way of putting this is that a
strong state implies that rebellions do not constitute a serious threat to the authorities in power. There
is an apt analogy here with the political economy of taxation literature (see, e.g., the classic paper by
Buchanan and Faith (1987)): when the threat of secession is low, the level of taxes is high. The only
minor diﬀerence here is that, in our analysis, the threat in question is not constituted by secession per
se, but by the deleterious eﬀects of the attempted secession.
One potential weakness of the analysis presented in the preceding sections is that (i) we restrict
mobilization to an aggregate measure, without distinguishing between its military and institutional
incarnations and (ii) that the simultaneous equation (full information) setup is predicated on the correct
specification of all four equations that go into the model. The first point is that working institutions
may increase the likelihood of mobilization through legal channels, while reducing mobilization that takes
on a military form. In other words, the preceding analysis could be driven by aggregation bias over the
form taken by mobilization. The second point is essentially econometric in nature. Though the 3SLS
procedure increases eﬃciency by exploiting the variance-covariance matrix of the disturbance terms of
all four equations, it is "fragile" in that specification error in one equation can be transmitted to the
other equation, even if they are correctly specified. Disaggregating our measure of mobilization and
adopting a less demanding 2SLS approach are therefore the topics of the next section.
5 Results based on 2SLS
5.1 Institutions, mobilization and rebellion
Tables 5, 8 and 9 present the results of the GM model estimated by 2SLS. In the first column of
each table, we report a benchmark OLS specification. In Table 5 we present results corresponding to
the rebellion equation. All variables are highly significant and display the expected signs, except for
grievances, which are statistically insignificant. Column (2) reports the 2SLS estimation of the rebellion
equation as it appears in the GM model. The coeﬃcients associated with mobilization and repression
increase dramatically with respect to OLS, while the eﬀects of democratic power and international re-
bellion become statistically indistinguishable from zero. Note that the Hansen test of the overidentifying
restrictions rejects, as shown by the extremely low reported p−value. Column (3) adds GDP per capita
and makes use of the AJR instrument set. Column (4) adds institutions. In contrast to the specifica-
tion of column (2), the overidentifying restrictions are not rejected, thereby providing support for our
earlier intuition that the absence of GDP per capita and institutions in the GM model leads to severe
omitted variable bias. While the overidentifying restrictions are no longer rejected, introducing GDP per
capita and institutions leaves the basic results unchanged: repression, institutions and mobilization are
all statistically significant determinants of rebellion, whereas grievances are not.
Results of the corresponding first-stage reduced forms are reported in Tables 6 and 7. As is apparent
in the columns labelled "(2)" (so as to correspond to column (2) of Tables 5, 8 and 9, which report the
results that correspond to the GM specification for the structural equations) the quality of the GM iden-
tification strategy is questionable, with the grievances equation being the only one in which the partial
R2 and partial F−statistics achieve appropriate levels. Economic discrimination, demographic distress
and past repression are significantly correlated with grievances and induce a substantial exogenous varia-
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tion in grievances. The instrument for mobilization, group coherence, is significantly associated with this
endogeneous variable, but produces a low partial R2 (5%). None of the instrumental variables appear
to oﬀer any identification for repression. In contrast, when GDP per capita and bureaucratic quality are
added to the specification, the identifying power of the instruments is reduced somewhat for grievances
but improves substantially for mobilization. Finally, as has been known since the publication of their
highly influential papers, the AJR (2001, 2002) colonization instruments explain more than 60% of the
variation in GDP per capita while the associated partial F−statistic is equal to 25%. For the case of
bureaucratic quality, the reduced form is the same as the one presented in Table 4.
Table 8 reports similar results, but for the mobilization equation. Using OLS, only grievances are a
significant determinant of mobilization. This remains true when one moves to 2SLS, with the coeﬃcient
associated with grievances being larger. In our preferred specification, which is reported in column (4),
GDP per capita exerts a negative and significant eﬀect on mobilization, while the opposite is true for
bureaucratic quality. This result confirms our finding of section 4, concerning the two-pronged eﬀect
of institutions on rebellion. On the one hand, a good institutional environment deters rebellion by
minorities while, on the other, the same institutional environment encourages the formation of organi-
zations representing the minority. At first glance, it would appear to be reassuring that bureaucratic
quality promotes institutional lobbying at the expense of military activities. But once one recalls, from
our previous results, that mobilization promotes violent conflict, the net eﬀect of working institutions
becomes ambiguous. At this stage in the analysis, however, we are unable to distinguish between legal
(institutional) and illegal (military) forms of mobilization. Similarly, we do not know whether these two
types of mobilization diﬀer in terms of their impact on rebellion. This question will be dealt with in the
last section of the paper.
Finally, Table 9 presents OLS and 2SLS results for the GM grievances equation. The endogeneous
variables that we add are statistically insignificant while the test of the overidentifying restrictions rejects.
Contrary to the two previous equations, the GM grievances specification would therefore not appear to
suﬀer from omitted variable bias.
5.2 The nature of mobilization
The MAR dataset codes mobilization (in terms of the organizations that represent the minority group) as
follows: 1 for open political organizations, 2 for non-legal and non-militant organizations, 3 for non-legal
and militant organizations and 4 for clandestine and militant organizations. So as to ascertain whether
the eﬀect of institutions on mobilization is diﬀerentiated by the type of mobilization at work, we replace
the previous mobilization variable either by the type of mobilization (as coded in the MAR dataset –this
is an average of the scores attributed to the various groups that purportedly represent a given minority)
or by an interactive variable given by the original mobilization variable times the type of mobilization
involved. The "type (continuous)" mobilization variable is therefore increasing in the violent and illegal
nature of the organizations representing a given minority group. A second mobilization variable can be
constructed as a dummy which is equal to 1 when the average score of the organizations representing
the minority group corresponds to the militant category (i.e. the average score is strictly greater than
2), and zero otherwise; we refer to this as the "type (binary)" variable. A third mobilization variable is
constructed by multiplying the original mobilization variable by the "type (continuous)" variable.
We report 2SLS results in Table 10. Results based on 3SLS (not reported) are similar. In the
right-hand portion of the table, we omit ethnolinguistic fragmentation from the specification in order
to ascertain whether this variable, which is often associated with violent mobilization, is driving the
results.
Several findings stand out. First, only GDP per capita has a statistically significant impact on the
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type of mobilization, whether it appears in continuous or in binary form. The richer a country is, the
less groups organize themselves into violent organizations. Hence, GDP per capita, which does not
significantly aﬀect mobilization when this concept is taken at the aggregate level (see Sections 3 and
4 above), does aﬀect the form taken by mobilization. Our empirical results therefore suggest that
economic development is a manner of deterring the formation of violent and clandestine organizations
in favor of groups that operate within the confines of the law. Second, bureaucratic quality has no
significant impact on the form taken by mobilization. Given our previous findings that bureaucratic
quality is a significant determinant of mobilization as a whole, this implies that the eﬀect of institutions
on mobilization was not driven by aggregation bias.
A robustness check of these results is provided by columns (3) and (6) of Table 10. Here, the
dependent variable is mobilization weighted by the type taken by the organization. Given the manner in
which type is coded in the MAR database, more weight is given to violent organizations than to those of
a legal ilk. If institutions influenced mobilization solely through legal organizations, then the coeﬃcient
associated with bureaucratic quality in these regressions should vanish or, at least, should decrease with
respect to our previous findings. The corresponding coeﬃcient reported in Table 5, 0.70, remains largely
unchanged in column (3) (0.68) and in column (6) (0.83) of Table 10. Though the point estimates are
of a similar magnitude, they are estimated much less precisely, with a standard error in column (3) that
is suﬃciently large for the coeﬃcient to be statistically indistinguishable from zero.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have reconsidered the well-known results of the Gurr and Moore (1997) simultaneous
equations model of rebellion, mobilization, grievances and repression by focusing both on the validity
of the underlying identification strategy, and on the impact of institutions on the structural equations
themselves. We have argued that institutions are likely to influence rebellion and mobilization given
their key roles in shaping the nature of the state as well as the incentives for the ruling elite to protect
property rights and adhere to democratic norms.
Adding institutional variables to 3SLS and 2SLS estimation of the GM model suggests that they
exert an ambiguous eﬀect on rebellion. On one hand, bureaucratic quality directly prevents rebellion,
probably through a deterrence eﬀect linked to the strength of the state and its bureaucratic (including
its military) apparatus. On the other hand, bureaucratic quality increases mobilization, which is itself an
important determinant of rebellion. This eﬀect of bureaucratic quality does not appear to be due to the
emergence of institutional lobbying in response to a better institutional climate. To the contrary, working
institutions increase all types of mobilization, probably as a result of predatory policies pursued by the
state. Such policies are impossible to implement in the absence of an eﬃcient and pliable bureaucracy
at the service of the ruler. As such, bureaucratic quality, ceteris paribus, would appear to be a necessary
condition for predatory policies, with these predatory policies provoking mobilization.
The findings reported in this paper have identified a reduced-form relationship, directly linking state
power to mobilization. What is lacking is an intermediate relationship connecting bureaucratic quality
to the type of policies that are implemented, given that it must be these policies that aﬀect grievances and
mobilization. Contrary to our initial intuition, discrimination and grievances do not react to bureaucratic
quality. Identifying the specific channels through which state power aﬀects policies will be a stimulating
topic for future research.
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Sample Original Ex-colonies
Discrimination variables assumed Exogenous Endogenous
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Equation 1: Rebellion
Grievances −0.13
(0.12)
−0.51
(0.25)
0.59
(0.18)
0.69
(0.19)
0.67
(0.21)
0.98
(0.34)
0.13
(0.26)
Mobilization 1.83
(0.41)
3.12
(0.71)
0.89
(0.31)
0.78
(0.31)
0.75
(0.29)
0.79
(0.45)
1.79
(0.35)
Democratic Power −0.05
(0.01)
−0.05
(0.02)
−0.07
(0.02)
−0.06
(0.02)
−0.06
(0.02)
−0.06
(0.03)
−0.01
(0.03)
International Rebellion 0.57
(0.16)
0.46
(0.27)
−0.03
(0.24)
−0.18
(0.26)
−0.13
(0.26)
−0.21
(0.30)
0.21
(0.30)
GDP per capita −0.58
(0.48)
−0.64
(0.53)
−0.73
(0.69)
0.63
(0.69)
Ethnolinguistic Fragmentation 0.00
(0.01)
0.01
(0.02)
0.02
(0.02)
Law and Order −0.01
(0.44)
Bureaucracy Quality −3.09
(0.86)
Equation 2: Mobilization
Group Coherence 0.27
(0.11)
0.19
(0.15)
0.49
(0.18)
0.48
(0.18)
0.60
(0.20)
0.50
(0.24)
0.67
(0.21)
Repression −0.59
(0.31)
−0.46
(0.28)
−1.33
(0.35)
−1.43
(0.34)
−1.58
(0.36)
−1.19
(0.40)
−1.74
(0.40)
Grievances 0.34
(0.05)
0.41
(0.07)
0.42
(0.07)
0.43
(0.07)
0.51
(0.09)
0.63
(0.10)
0.61
(0.10)
Equation 3: Grievances
Political Discrimination −0.04
(0.21)
−0.36
(0.26)
−3.69
(0.70)
−3.64
(0.71)
−3.00
(0.70)
−1.25
(0.71)
−3.17
(0.81)
Economic Discrimination 0.67
(0.24)
0.52
(0.28)
2.40
(0.75)
2.35
(0.74)
2.10
(0.73)
1.55
(0.84)
2.69
(0.80)
Demographic Distress 0.34
(0.07)
0.34
(0.09)
0.35
(0.10)
0.36
(0.10)
0.33
(0.10)
0.32
(0.10)
0.34
(0.10)
Lost Autonomy 0.89
(0.30)
0.60
(0.36)
1.10
(0.47)
1.10
(0.47)
0.89
(0.50)
0.57
(0.60)
1.25
(0.54)
Past Repression Success 0.48
(0.15)
0.58
(0.17)
0.60
(0.20)
0.59
(0.20)
0.51
(0.20)
0.45
(0.21)
0.25
(0.21)
Equation 4: Repression
Democracy −0.02
(0.01)
0.01
(0.02)
0.02
(0.02)
0.01
(0.02)
0.02
(0.02)
0.02
(0.03)
0.02
(0.02)
Past Repression Success 0.34
(0.10)
0.32
(0.14)
0.24
(0.16)
0.19
(0.16)
0.16
(0.16)
0.12
(0.21)
0.14
(0.17)
Observations 202 120 101 99 94 80 91
Table 1: Rebellion, mobilization, grievances and repression: 3SLS estimates
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Dependent variable Political discrimination Economic discrimination
Corresponding col. in Table 1 (3) (4) (5) (6) (3) (4) (5) (6)
AJR instruments
Settler mortality −0.15
(0.15)
−0.17
(0.15)
−0.15
(0.16)
−0.36
(0.20)
−0.29
(0.15)
−0.31
(0.15)
−0.25
(0.16)
−0.17
(0.19)
Democracy in 1900 −0.05
(0.14)
−0.05
(0.14)
−0.06
(0.14)
−0.21
(0.18)
−0.18
(0.14)
−0.18
(0.14)
−0.22
(0.14)
−0.27
(0.17)
Constr. on executive in 1900 0.00
(0.16)
0.00
(0.16)
0.02
(0.17)
0.16
(0.18)
0.09
(0.16)
0.09
(0.16)
0.18
(0.17)
0.25
(0.18)
Prop. of white settlers in 1900 0.00
(0.01)
0.00
(0.01)
0.00
(0.01)
−0.01
(0.02)
0.00
(0.01)
0.00
(0.01)
0.01
(0.01)
0.01
(0.02)
Log of population density in 1500 0.01
(0.11)
0.01
(0.11)
0.00
(0.12)
−0.19
(0.17)
0.05
(0.11)
0.04
(0.11)
0.03
(0.12)
0.09
(0.17)
Exogenous controls
Demographic Distress 0.07
(0.03)
0.07
(0.03)
0.07
(0.03)
0.09
(0.03)
0.09
(0.03)
0.09
(0.03)
0.09
(0.03)
0.08
(0.03)
Lost Autonomy 0.20
(0.15)
0.20
(0.15)
0.18
(0.16)
0.22
(0.16)
−0.18
(0.15)
−0.19
(0.15)
−0.27
(0.16)
−0.32
(0.16)
Past Repression 0.04
(0.07)
0.04
(0.07)
0.01
(0.07)
−0.06
(0.08)
0.26
(0.07)
0.26
(0.07)
0.23
(0.07)
0.20
(0.08)
International Rebellion −0.27
(0.10)
−0.26
(0.10)
−0.23
(0.10)
−0.28
(0.11)
−0.29
(0.10)
−0.28
(0.10)
−0.26
(0.10)
−0.27
(0.11)
Democratic Power 0.01
(0.01)
0.01
(0.01)
0.01
(0.01)
0.01
(0.01)
0.00
(0.01)
−0.01
(0.01)
−0.01
(0.01)
0.00
(0.01)
Ethnolinguistic Fragmentation 0.00
(0.01)
0.01
(0.01)
0.01
(0.01)
0.01
(0.01)
Group Coherence −0.13
(0.10)
−0.14
(0.10)
−0.17
(0.11)
−0.12
(0.12)
−0.17
(0.11)
−0.18
(0.10)
−0.18
(0.11)
−0.22
(0.12)
Democracy −0.07
(0.03)
−0.06
(0.03)
−0.07
(0.03)
−0.06
(0.03)
0.03
(0.03)
0.03
(0.03)
0.02
(0.03)
0.00
(0.03)
Past Repression Success 0.10
(0.16)
0.12
(0.16)
0.14
(0.18)
0.36
(0.20)
−0.08
(0.16)
−0.07
(0.16)
−0.01
(0.17)
−0.01
(0.20)
R2 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.29 0.40 0.42 0.42 0.44
F -statistic 2.00 1.99 1.66 1.93 4.40 4.76 4.01 3.69
"Partialled out" reduced form
R2 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.06
F -statistic 0.32 0.36 0.25 1.15 1.33 1.47 1.20 1.00
Observations 101 99 94 80 101 99 94 80
Table 2: Reduced forms for political and economic discrimination
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Equation 1: Rebellion
Grievances 0.36
(0.30)
0.48
(0.20)
0.43
(0.31)
−0.31
(0.25)
0.45
(0.31)
−0.18
(0.24)
Mobilization 1.40
(0.42)
1.08
(0.30)
1.29
(0.44)
2.47
(0.37)
1.28
(0.43)
2.43
(0.35)
Democratic Power −0.04
(0.03)
−0.04
(0.03)
−0.04
(0.03)
0.02
(0.03)
−0.03
(0.03)
0.02
(0.03)
International Rebellion 0.18
(0.30)
0.02
(0.27)
0.20
(0.30)
0.48
(0.30)
0.19
(0.30)
0.35
(0.29)
GDP per capita −0.23
(0.62)
−0.77
(0.53)
−0.27
(0.64)
1.28
(0.72)
−0.30
(0.63)
0.77
(0.66)
Ethnolinguistic Fragmentation 0.00
(0.02)
−0.01
(0.02)
0.00
(0.02)
0.02
(0.02)
0.00
(0.02)
0.01
(0.02)
Law and Order 0.31
(0.41)
0.61
(0.47)
Bureaucratic Quality −4.51
(0.80)
−4.42
(0.78)
Equation 2: Mobilization
Group Coherence 0.44
(0.23)
0.52
(0.19)
0.45
(0.23)
0.46
(0.18)
0.42
(0.23)
0.42
(0.17)
Repression −0.83
(0.37)
−1.21
(0.35)
−0.87
(0.37)
−1.05
(0.35)
−0.84
(0.37)
−1.01
(0.34)
Grievances 0.64
(0.09)
0.57
(0.09)
0.64
(0.09)
0.56
(0.09)
0.65
(0.09)
0.54
(0.09)
Law and Order 0.17
(0.23)
0.32
(0.26)
0.36
(0.32)
Bureaucratic Quality 0.58
(0.25)
0.62
(0.25)
0.30
(0.27)
Equation 3: Grievances
Political Discrimination −0.70
(0.30)
−0.60
(0.28)
−0.70
(0.30)
−0.47
(0.31)
−0.66
(0.30)
−0.47
(0.28)
Economic Discrimination 0.24
(0.32)
0.11
(0.29)
0.24
(0.32)
0.31
(0.31)
0.18
(0.32)
0.12
(0.29)
Demographic Distress 0.37
(0.09)
0.40
(0.09)
0.37
(0.09)
0.39
(0.09)
0.35
(0.09)
0.37
(0.09)
Lost Autonomy 0.42
(0.40)
0.39
(0.37)
0.43
(0.40)
0.43
(0.39)
0.37
(0.39)
0.47
(0.36)
Past Repression 0.49
(0.18)
0.59
(0.17)
0.48
(0.18)
0.44
(0.19)
0.50
(0.17)
0.54
(0.19)
Law and Order −0.64
(0.42)
Bureaucratic Quality 1.77
(0.51)
Equation 4: Repression
Democracy 0.01
(0.03)
0.01
(0.02)
0.01
(0.03)
0.01
(0.02)
0.01
(0.03)
0.02
(0.02)
Past Repression Success 0.16
(0.12)
0.22
(0.18)
0.15
(0.22)
0.16
(0.18)
0.17
(0.22)
0.20
(0.17)
Observations 80 91 80 91 80 91
Table 3: GM model augmented with institutions: 3SLS estimates
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Dependent variable Law and Order Bureaucratic Quality
Corresponding col. in Table 3 (1-3-5) (2-4-6)
AJR instruments
Settler mortality −0.37
(0.25)
−0.36
(0.16)
Democracy in 1900 0.44
(0.22)
−0.24
(0.14)
Constr. on executive in 1900 −0.21
(0.23)
0.09
(0.16)
Prop. of white settlers in 1900 −0.05
(0.02)
−0.01
(0.01)
Log of population density in 1500 −0.74
(0.22)
−0.12
(0.12)
Exogenous controls
Political Discrimination −0.15
(0.17)
0.12
(0.12)
Economic Discrimination −0.03
(0.17)
0.09
(0.12)
Demographic Distress 0.01
(0.04)
−0.03
(0.03)
Lost Autonomy −0.19
(0.21)
−0.09
(0.16)
Past Repression −0.02
(0.11)
−0.22
(0.08)
International Rebellion 0.06
(0.15)
0.06
(0.11)
Democratic Power −0.04
(0.01)
0.03
(0.01)
Ethnolinguistic Fragmentation 0.02
(0.01)
0.00
(0.01)
Group Coherence 0.27
(0.15)
0.14
(0.11)
Democracy 0.04
(0.04)
−0.01
(0.03)
Past Repression Success −0.05
(0.26)
0.30
(0.17)
R2 0.42 0.43
F -statistic 2.87 3.53
"Partialled out" reduced form
R2 0.31 0.13
F -statistic 6.81 2.63
Observations 80 91
Table 4: Reduced forms for rule of law and bureaucratic quality
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Dependent variable Rebellion
Estimator OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Endogeneous
Grievances 0.03
(0.08)
−0.23
(0.30)
0.14
(0.21)
−0.33
(0.31)
Mobilization 0.79
(0.19)
2.27
(0.73)
1.20
(0.30)
1.79
(0.52)
Repression 0.93
(0.19)
1.29
(0.80)
1.82
(0.50)
1.91
(0.75)
Log of GDP per capita −0.46
(0.64)
0.66
(0.98)
Bureaucratic Quality −3.02
(1.19)
Exogenous controls
Democratic Power −0.05
(0.01)
−0.06
(0.08)
−0.05
(0.02)
0.02
(0.04)
International Rebellion 0.74
(0.21)
0.27
(0.37)
0.16
(0.25)
0.46
(0.36)
Ethnolinguistic Fragmentation −0.01
(0.02)
0.01
(0.03)
R2 0.45
F -statistic 19.03 11.29 6.28 7.01
Hansen p−value 0.06 0.37 0.96
Observations 120 111 94 91
Table 5: Rebellion equation: OLS and 2SLS estimates
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Dependent variable Grievances Mobilization
Corresponding col. in Tab. 5 (2) (3) (4) (2) (3) (4)
Instruments
Group coherence 0.35
(0.16)
0.41
(0.15)
0.41
(0.15)
Political Discrimination 0.30
(0.36)
0.12
(0.39)
−0.01
(0.41)
Economic Discrimination 0.66
(0.34)
0.31
(0.39)
0.37
(0.41)
Demographic Distress 0.23
(0.10)
0.22
(0.11)
0.26
(0.12)
Lost Autonomy 0.42
(0.48)
0.66
(0.55)
0.68
(0.55)
Past Repression Success 0.46
(0.23)
0.34
(0.26)
0.28
(0.27)
Exogenous controls
Democratic Power 0.02
(0.03)
0.04
(0.04)
0.04
(0.04)
0.00
(0.01)
−0.02
(0.01)
−0.02
(0.01)
International Rebellion 0.56
(0.26)
0.23
(0.36)
0.30
(0.37)
0.46
(0.12)
0.06
(0.15)
0.11
(0.15)
Ethnolinguistic Fragmentation 0.01
(0.02)
0.02
(0.02)
−0.01
(0.01)
0.00
(0.01)
Political Discrimination 0.15
(0.17)
0.08
(0.16)
0.01
(0.17)
Economic Discrimination 0.08
(0.16)
−0.01
(0.16)
0.05
(0.17)
Democracy 0.15
(0.09)
0.04
(0.11)
0.03
(0.11)
Past repression Success −0.34
(0.44)
0.10
(0.57)
0.04
(0.60)
Group Coherence 0.19
(0.34)
0.10
(0.37)
0.08
(0.37)
Demographic Distress 0.09
(0.05)
0.10
(0.05)
0.11
(0.05)
Lost Autonomy −0.26
(0.22)
−0.03
(0.22)
−0.01
(0.22)
Past Repression Success 0.30
(0.11)
0.36
(0.11)
0.34
(0.11)
Settler mortality −0.54
(0.54)
−0.51
(0.54)
−1.23
(0.22)
−1.21
(0.22)
Democracy in 1900 0.17
(0.49)
0.17
(0.49)
0.06
(0.20)
0.07
(0.20)
Constr. on executive in 1900 −0.23
(0.56)
−0.18
(0.57)
−0.33
(0.23)
−0.32
(0.23)
Prop. of white settlers in 1900 0.10
(0.05)
0.10
(0.05)
−0.04
(0.02)
−0.03
(0.02)
Log of population density in 1500 0.86
(0.39)
0.80
(0.40)
−0.03
(0.16)
−0.04
(0.16)
R2 0.35 0.37 0.38 0.32 0.55 0.57
F -statistic 5.32 2.89 2.84 4.69 5.93 6.18
"Partialled out" reduced form
R2 0.19 0.13 0.13 0.05 0.09 0.09
F -statistic 6.22 2.54 2.56 5.20 8.89 8.83
Observations 111 94 91 111 94 91
Table 6: Reduced forms for grievances and mobilization
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Dependent variable GDP per capita Repression
Corresponding col. in Tab. 5 (3) (4) (2) (3) (4)
Instruments
Democracy −0.02
(0.04)
−0.01
(0.05)
−0.01
(0.05)
Past Repression Success 0.29
(0.19)
0.24
(0.27)
0.06
(0.27)
Settler mortality −0.31
(0.07)
−0.32
(0.07)
Democracy in 1900 0.13
(0.07)
0.12
(0.07)
Constr. on executive in 1900 −0.35
(0.08)
−0.35
(0.08)
Prop. of white settlers in 1900 0.03
(0.01)
0.03
(0.01)
Log of population density in 1500 −0.20
(0.05)
−0.20
(0.05)
Exogenous controls
Democratic Power 0.03
(0.01)
0.03
(0.01)
0.01
(0.01)
0.01
(0.02)
0.01
(0.02)
International Rebellion −0.08
(0.05)
−0.10
(0.05)
−0.17
(0.11)
−0.30
(0.17)
−0.24
(0.17)
Group Coherence −0.05
(0.05)
−0.05
(0.05)
0.20
(0.14)
0.17
(0.17)
0.17
(0.17)
Past Repression −0.07
(0.03)
−0.06
(0.03)
−0.12
(0.10)
−0.08
(0.12)
−0.06
(0.12)
Political Discrimination −0.08
(0.05)
−0.05
(0.05)
−0.12
(0.15)
−0.12
(0.18)
−0.14
(0.18)
Economic Discrimination 0.05
(0.05)
0.02
(0.06)
−0.12
(0.15)
−0.19
(0.18)
−0.12
(0.19)
Demographic Distress −0.01
(0.02)
−0.01
(0.01)
0.10
(0.04)
0.13
(0.05)
0.13
(0.05)
Lost Autonomy 0.02
(0.08)
0.01
(0.07)
0.31
(0.20)
0.43
(0.25)
0.46
(0.25)
Past Repression Success 0.09
(0.08)
0.13
(0.08)
Democracy −0.05
(0.01)
−0.05
(0.01)
Ethnolinguistic Fragmentation −0.02
(0.01)
−0.02
(0.01)
0.01
(0.01)
0.01
(0.01)
Settler mortality 0.07
(0.25)
0.09
(0.24)
Democracy in 1900 −0.16
(0.23)
−0.12
(0.22)
Constr. on executive in 1900 0.16
(0.26)
0.11
(0.26)
Prop. of white settlers in 1900 0.01
(0.02)
0.01
(0.02)
Log of population density in 1500 0.17
(0.18)
0.21
(0.18)
R2 0.84 0.85 0.14 0.17 0.18
F -statistic 25.10 26.69 1.57 1.01 1.01
"Partialled out" reduced form
R2 0.61 0.62 0.02 0.01 0.00
F -statistic 27.68 28.07 1.40 0.51 0.08
Observations 94 91 111 94 91
Table 7: Reduced forms for bureaucratic quality and GDP per capita
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Dependent variable Mobilization
Estimator OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Endogeneous
Grievances 0.17
(0.04)
0.34
(0.06)
0.47
(0.11)
0.48
(0.11)
Repression −0.05
(0.08)
−0.15
(0.50)
−0.94
(0.60)
−0.77
(0.58)
Log of GDP per capita −0.17
(0.28)
−0.55
(0.27)
Bureaucratic Quality 0.70
(0.37)
Exogenous controls
Group coherence 0.21
(0.15)
0.28
(0.19)
0.52
(0.22)
0.42
(0.26)
Ethnolinguistic Fragmentation 0.01
(0.01)
0.00
(0.01)
R2 0.13
F -statistic 6.68 10.47 5.95 4.25
Hansen p−value 0.27 0.38 0.19
Observations 120 111 94 91
Table 8: Mobilization equation: OLS and 2SLS estimates
Dependent variable Grievances
Estimator OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3)
Endogenous Log GDP
per capita
Log of GDP per capita 0.61
(0.58)
0.30
(0.92)
Bureaucratic Quality 0.76
(1.01)
Exogenous controls
Political Discrimination −0.29
(0.30)
−0.29
(0.36)
−0.43
(0.40)
Economic Discrimination 0.86
(0.32)
0.48
(0.42)
0.43
(0.50)
Lost Autonomy 0.68
(0.42)
0.72
(0.37)
0.77
(0.40)
Demographic Distress 0.33
(0.10)
0.36
(0.11)
0.40
(0.11)
Past Repression 0.36
(0.19)
0.36
(0.18)
0.40
(0.27)
Ethnolinguistic Fragmentation 0.01
(0.02)
0.01
(0.02)
R2 0.27
F -statistic 8.46 3.14 3.13
Hansen p−value 0.03 0.01
Observations 120 94 91
Table 9: Grievances equation: OLS and 2SLS estimates
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Dependent variable Type Type Mobilization Type Type Mobilization
(Continuous) (Binary) ×Type (Continuous) (Binary) ×Type
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Endogenous
Grievances −0.01
(0.04)
0.00
(0.03)
0.61
(0.20)
0.00
(0.03)
0.00
(0.02)
0.63
(0.17)
Repression 0.22
(0.15)
0.01
(0.67)
0.22
(0.15)
0.18
(0.16)
0.08
(0.08)
−0.23
(0.67)
Log of GDP per capita −0.18
(0.13)
−1.28
(0.55)
−0.18
(0.13)
−0.28
(0.08)
−0.21
(0.05)
−1.57
(0.47)
Bureaucratic Quality −0.05
(0.12)
−0.01
(0.07)
0.68
(0.55)
0.00
(0.11)
0.01
(0.07)
0.83
(0.47)
Exogenous
Group Coherence 0.00
(0.11)
−0.04
(0.07)
0.26
(0.52)
−0.01
(0.13)
−0.04
(0.07)
0.20
(0.56)
Ethnolinguistic Fragmentation 0.00
(0.11)
0.00
(0.01)
0.01
(0.02)
F -statistic 4.95 4.21 9.04 5.33 4.84 10.14
Hansen p−value 0.21 0.09 0.23 0.15 0.21 0.37
Observations 63 63 63 66 66 66
Table 10: Institutions and type of mobilization: 2SLS estimates
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